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Lipez: The Nature of the Judicial Process

JUSTICE CARDOZO’S THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: A CASE STUDY
Judge Kermit V. Lipez,
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Presented at the Cardozo Symposium at Touro Law Center
March 23, 2017*
INTRODUCTION
In almost thirty-two years as a judge, state and federal, trial and
appellate, I have written more than 1300 opinions. Although I do not
have the gift of some of my colleagues who remember every opinion
that they have written, I have written some opinions that I can never
forget. I want to focus on one of those opinions -- a dissent that I wrote
in 1995 as a member of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
I have chosen this case because the majority opinion and
dissent illustrate many of Justice Cardozo’s insights about judicial
decision-making from his four lectures in 1921 on “The Nature of the
Judicial Process.”1 Reflecting on his experience on the New York
Court of Appeals, Cardozo wrote that most of the cases that come
before his court “could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in
any way but one. The law and its application alike are plain.”2 Then
there are the cases that inspired Cardozo’s lectures, where “[t]here are
gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There
are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided.”3 For me,
Dasha v. Maine Medical Center4 was one of those cases.
*I

wish to thank my talented law clerk, Nicholas Meyers, for his valuable help in preparing
this essay.
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) [hereinafter
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS]. [Note: page numbers in brackets indicate page numbers in the
2010 paperback edition].
2 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 164 [105].
3 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4].
4 Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 995 (Me. 1995).
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I.
Joseph Dasha was an Army veteran who earned his living by
writing complex technical manuals, largely for the Navy. After
experiencing seizures for a number of years, he had an MRI performed
in Maine in 1988 that disclosed a brain tumor. Dasha was then 56
years old.5
In June 1988, Dasha underwent surgery at the Maine Medical
Center in Portland to remove the tumor. The surgeon’s findings -- that
the tumor was round, smooth and came out easily6 -- suggested a
benign tumor. To the surgeon’s surprise, however, a pathologist at
Maine Medical Center diagnosed the tumor as an aggressive and fatal
form of cancer.7 Dasha was advised to undergo a series of radiation
treatments of his brain to prolong his life.8 Without treatment he might
survive six months. With treatment he could survive eighteen months
to two years.9 During July and August of that year, Dasha had
approximately thirty high-dosage radiation treatments.10 On August 1,
while he was receiving the radiation treatments in Portland, a
neuropathologist at the New England Medical Center in Boston
confirmed the diagnosis of Dasha’s fatal tumor.11
In September, in need of care, Dasha moved from his home in
Scarborough, Maine to Needham, Massachusetts to live with his sister
Margaret.12 There, he experienced a steady decline in his capacities
because of severe brain damage from the radiation treatments.13 He
could not walk or sit and he became incontinent. He developed poor
memory and had difficulty speaking.14 On March 2, 1989, Dasha
executed a power of attorney in favor of his sister.15 The parties agreed
5

E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file
with author).
6 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file
with author).
7 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file
with author).
8 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11
Id.
12 Dasha v. Adelman, 699 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Mass. App. 1998).
13 Id.
14 Dasha vs. Maine Med. Ctr., D. Me., No. CIV. 93-343-P-C, 1994 WL 371464 (July 8,
1994).
15 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994.
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that he was mentally incompetent by that point.16 In November 1990,
a doctor at Newton-Wellesley Hospital, surprised that Dasha was
doing better physically than the initial diagnosis of a fatal tumor had
predicted, asked the New England Medical Center neuropathologist
who had confirmed that diagnosis to review Dasha’s tissue samples
again.17 After doing so, the neuropathologist revised his diagnosis and
concluded that Dasha’s tumor was relatively benign and had a
favorable prognosis.18
In March 1991, approximately two years and nine months after
the misdiagnosis by the pathologist at Maine Medical Center, Margaret
Dasha was informed of the error. She subsequently notified Maine
Medical Center that she intended to file a lawsuit against Maine
Medical Center on her brother’s behalf in federal court in Portland.19
At that point, three years and eleven months had passed since the
misdiagnosis.20 In response to the lawsuit, Maine Medical Center
asserted the statute of limitations as a defense. Maine law requires that
actions for professional negligence “be commenced within 3 years
after the cause of action accrues.”21 The statute further specifies that
“a cause of action accrues on the date of the act or omission giving rise
to the injury.”22 In choosing that definition of accrual, the Maine
legislature abrogated the more generous discovery rule that the Maine
Supreme Court, in the absence of a statutory definition of accrual, had
adopted for medical malpractice actions.23 With a discovery rule, a
cause of action does not accrue, that is, the commencement of the
statute of limitations is tolled, until a plaintiff reasonably could know
of the harm he suffered.
The parties agreed that Dasha’s action was not filed within
three years of the date of the misdiagnosis, the date of accrual.24 Dasha
contended, however, that Maine Medical Center should be equitably
16

Id.
Id.
18 Id.
19 The filing of this notice tolls the statute of limitations if it has not already expired. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2859 (2018). The actual lawsuit does not need to be filed for
this purpose.
20 This narrative has included many dates. To help the reader understand the chronology, I
have added an appendix detailing the relevant dates.
21 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018).
22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018).
23 See Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803, 806 (Me. 1994) (discussing legislative history of
P.L.1985, ch. 804).
24 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994.
17
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estopped, that is, barred, from raising the statute of limitations as a
defense because the unnecessary radiation treatments caused by its
misdiagnosis had made him incapable of understanding and asserting
his legal rights after March 2, 1989, the agreed upon date of his mental
incompetence.25 That date was almost nine months after the
misdiagnosis by Maine Medical Center, and approximately two years
and three months before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
During that two years and three months, given his inability to
understand and assert his legal rights, Dasha did not have the capacity
to file a malpractice action before the expiration of the statute of
limitations. It would be unfair to allow Maine Medical Center to
benefit from its own wrongdoing under that circumstance.
On the basis of agreed upon facts, the federal court in Portland
reviewed Maine’s law of equitable estoppel and concluded that its
applicability to Dasha’s case was uncertain.26 Traditionally, equitable
estoppel applies when a plaintiff can show that he filed a lawsuit
beyond the statute of limitations period because he relied on some
misrepresentation by the defendant subsequent to the negligent act.27
In Dasha’s case, there was no subsequent misrepresentation. Maine
Medical Center’s negligent act itself -- the misdiagnosis which led to
his mental incompetence -- deprived Dasha of the ability to protect
himself during a substantial portion of the statute of limitations period.
Aware of this unusual circumstance, the federal court asked the Maine
Supreme Court to decide whether Dasha should be allowed to invoke
Maine’s doctrine of equitable estoppel.28
In addressing that question, my colleagues cited language from
our precedents stating that equitable estoppel “is a doctrine that should
be carefully and sparingly applied.”29 Then, turning to the record, and
taking the traditional view of equitable estoppel, the majority saw the
negligent diagnosis of Maine Medical Center as irrelevant to the

25

Id.
Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., CIV. 93-343-P-C, 1994 WL 371464, at *1 (D. Me. July 8,
1994).
27 See Anderson v. Commissioner of Dept. of Human Servs., 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me.
1985); but see Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534, 539 (Me. 1977) (holding that
a claim of equitable estoppel can be supported by an act of negligence that is the equivalent of
fraud).
28 Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., CIV. 93-343-P-C, 1994 WL 371464, at *3 (D. Me. July 8,
1994).
29 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 995 (quoting Vacuum Sys., Inc. v. Bridge Const. Co., 632 A.2d 442,
444 (Me. 1993)).
26
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applicability of equitable estoppel to Dasha’s claim. Instead, the
majority focused on the hospital’s conduct after the misdiagnosis.30
Did Dasha detrimentally rely on any misrepresentation by Maine
Medical Center that induced him to run afoul of the statute of
limitations, such as “Don’t worry. We will take care of you,” or “You
have plenty of time to file your lawsuit?”
Answering that question “no,” the majority wrote that “Dasha
relied on the misdiagnosis to seek radiation treatments, but he did not
rely on a misrepresentation of MMC to decide to forego legal
redress.”31 In the absence of this traditional element, the majority
concluded that Dasha’s claim against Maine Medical Center was
barred by the statute of limitations.32
In my view, however, the detrimental reliance required by
equitable estoppel was present in Dasha’s case, but it took a different,
more lethal form. As I wrote in my dissent: “MMC’s conduct
effectively prevented Dasha from filing a timely cause of action in a
manner far more devastating than fraud. The conduct of MMC made
Dasha incompetent and unable even to understand that he had a cause
of action.”33 Hence, unlike the majority, I would have advised the

30

Id. at 994.
Id. at 995.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 997 (Lipez, J., dissenting). I noted in my dissent that Dasha had executed a power
of attorney in favor of Margaret in March 1989, prior to the expiration of the three-year statute
of limitations. She also learned of the Maine Medical Center diagnosis several months prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In my view, those facts did not preclude
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel:
In equitable tolling cases, the existence of a power of attorney conferred
by a person before the onset of incapacity does not preclude application
of the tolling statute:
The aim of the tolling statute is “to relieve from the strict time
restrictions any person who actually lacks the ability and
capacity, due to mental affliction, to pursue his lawful rights. . .
.” (citations omitted) The statute does not condition tolling on
the absence of others who may be legally authorized to act for
the insane person.
Kisselbach v. County of Camden, 271 N.J. Super. 558, 638 A.2d 1383,
1387 (1994). That same principle should apply to this equitable estoppel
case. The power of attorney conferred on Margaret Dasha the authority
to sue when she learned of the misdiagnosis approximately two years and
nine months after it occurred, not the obligation to do so. Id.
Dasha, 665 A.2d at 997 n.3 (Lipez, J., dissenting). Consistent with this view, the majority did
not rely on the existence of the power of attorney in concluding that Dasha could not invoke
equitable estoppel as a bar to the statute of limitations.
31
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federal court that Dasha could invoke equitable estoppel as a bar to the
statute of limitations.
II.
Looking back on these competing opinions, I now realize that
my colleagues and I had engaged, unwittingly, in a decision-making
process that reveals the continuing relevance of Cardozo’s lectures on
the judicial process.34
To begin, Cardozo captured my predicament in Dasha
when he described the “anxious judge” with a “semi-intuitive
apprehension” that a decision against Dasha would be contrary to “the
pervading spirit of our law.”35 On such egregious facts, how could we
close the courthouse door to him? Yet I knew that anxiety and
apprehension were no substitute for analysis. My colleagues and I had
to begin our analysis of Dasha’s claim where we must always begin -with the precedents.
Cardozo insisted on the importance of stare decisis.
“Adherence to precedent,” he said, “must . . . be the rule rather than
the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed
administration of justice in the court.”36 These precedents
fix the point of departure from which the labor of the
judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to
examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the
point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis
is at least the everyday working rule of our law.37
My colleagues in Dasha were faithful to this principle. They
found the leading cases in Maine on equitable estoppel, noted the
elements of the doctrine, applied them to the undisputed facts in
Dasha’s case, found the necessary elements missing, and concluded
that our precedents were “plain and to the point,” with “need of nothing

34 Although I criticize the majority opinion of my colleagues, as I did in my dissent, I have
the utmost respect for them. I have the advantage here of an unchallenged elaboration of my
position. Given the opportunity, I know that my colleagues could offer a thoughtful
elaboration of their position.
35 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 43 [23].
36 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 34 [17].
37 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8].
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more.”38 It was clear to them that Dasha could not invoke equitable
estoppel to save his claim.
In taking that approach, however, my colleagues ignored
Cardozo’s warning that a “process of search [for precedents],
comparison and little more”39 was misguided. It was not enough “to
match the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many sample
cases spread out upon their desk,”40 with “the sample nearest in shade
suppl[ying] the applicable rule . . . [N]o system of living law can be
evolved by such a process . . . It is when the colors do not match . . .
that the serious business of the judge begins.”41 Although the colors
of our cases on equitable estoppel did not match Dasha’s case, we were
in the realm of equity, where we had some license to depart from
precedents that did not fill what Cardozo describes as “gaps” or
“interstices” in the law.
Still, as Cardozo reminds us, and Cardozo always reminds us
of countervailing principles, there are constraints on that license. In
deciding the immediate case, we are fashioning law for the cases that
will follow.42 We must remember, as Cardozo puts it, that “[t]he
sentence of today will make the right and wrong of tomorrow.”43
Also, where statutes are in play, there must be respect for
legislative judgment. “The rule that fits the case may be supplied by
the constitution or by statute,” Cardozo writes. “If that is so, the judge
looks no further. The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to
obey.”44 But that correspondence is elusive when judges must
determine legislative intent from uncertain words, or determine
whether the community’s “sense of law and order”45 precludes
application of a statute of clear meaning to an unforeseen and
unsettling circumstance.
Dasha’s case did not require us to determine legislative intent
from ambiguous words. There was no ambiguity in the meaning of the
statute of limitations, which said clearly that actions for professional
negligence had to “be commenced within 3 years after the cause of

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20-21 [8-9].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 21 [9].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 21 [9].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4].
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action accrues.”46 Dasha involved a different kind of gap in the law -the uncertain relationship between the legislatively determined statute
of limitations and the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel,
created by judges to bar the application of rules, including statutes,
under circumstances that might offend the community’s “sense of law
and order,” and, as such, in the case of statutes, be contrary to
legislative intent.
That inquiry in Dasha was particularly complicated because of
the statutory language providing that “a cause of action accrues on the
date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury.”47 As noted earlier,
the Maine legislature, in choosing that accrual language, eliminated the
judicially created discovery rule for medical malpractice actions.
However, the Legislature left in place the discovery rule for “foreign
object surgical cases.” It also did not disturb the tolling provisions for
claims brought by plaintiffs who were “minors, . . . mentally ill,
imprisoned or without the limits of the United States” when their cause
of action accrued.48 The parties agreed that Dasha was “competent at
the time of the misdiagnosis and during the radiation treatment.”49 So
one could argue that Dasha was, in effect, asking the judges, in direct
contravention of the legislative judgment, to create a further exception
to the abrogation of the discovery rule for those cases in which an
individual, after the act of malpractice, became incompetent during the
statute of limitations period.
If that was a fair view of Dasha’s argument, Cardozo would say
that “the correspondence ascertained,” it was the duty of the judges to
obey.”50 The Legislature had explicitly decided which exceptions
would survive its elimination of the discovery rule for medical
malpractice cases. But neither I nor the majority felt that it was fair to
view Dasha’s equitable estoppel argument as, in effect, an equitable
tolling argument designed to undermine the Legislature’s judgment on
the discovery rule. Equitable tolling focuses on the circumstances of
a plaintiff, such as minority status or mental illness. Those
circumstances make it unfair to allow the statute of limitations to run

46

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018).
48 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 996 (discussing legislative history of statute of limitations in medical
malpractice actions); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 853 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §2902 (2018).
49 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994-95.
50 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4].
47
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when a plaintiff cannot reasonably discover what has happened to him.
In equitable estoppel cases, on the other hand, the focus is on the
conduct of the defendant. Did the defendant behave in a way towards
the plaintiff that would make it unfair to allow the defendant to raise
an expired statute of limitations as a defense? In my view, and the
majority’s, Maine’s statute of limitations for malpractice cases did not
preclude consideration of Dasha’s equitable estoppel argument.
Rather, the question we had to answer was how that common law
doctrine should evolve in the face of a difficult case like Dasha’s. That
is the “serious business of judging”51 to which Cardozo devotes his
lectures.
III.
Cardozo famously writes that judges may use four methods to
evaluate “the directive force of a principle”52 such as equitable
estoppel. They are:
First, the line of logical progression, which he called the
rule of analogy or the method of philosophy;53
Second, the line of historical development, which he
called the method of evolution;54
Third, the line of the customs of the community, which
he called the method of tradition;55 and
Fourth, the lines of justice, morals and social welfare,
which he called the method of sociology.56
Cardozo is not suggesting that these four methods are relevant to every
case requiring judges to fill a gap in the law. Their relevance will
depend on the nature of the case. For example, when he writes of
custom, Cardozo refers to the application of old rules of commerce to
the new realms “of steam and electricity, the railroad and the

51
52
53
54
55
56

CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20-21 [8-9].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30 [15].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15].
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steamship, the telegraph and the telephone.”57 These realms of
commerce are far removed from the world of medical care. There, the
methods of philosophy, history and sociology are relevant to the
directive force of the principle of equitable estoppel in a malpractice
case.
Cardozo places “the rule of analogy or the method of
philosophy” first among his principles of selection because it has, he
says, “a certain presumption in its favor . . . . It has the primacy that
comes from natural and orderly and logical succession.”58 In Dasha, I
used the rule of analogy. The majority had emphasized the traditional
requirement of equitable estoppel that a plaintiff must detrimentally
rely on a fraudulent or negligent representation by the defendant,
subsequent to the negligent conduct, in foregoing a legal action that he
had intended to pursue.59 Dasha had shown no such reliance. In my
dissent, I said there was a fair analogy between that traditional
detrimental reliance requirement and Dasha’s reliance on the negligent
misdiagnosis of Maine Medical Center to submit to the massive
radiation treatments that made him incompetent and unable to seek
timely redress during a substantial portion of the statute of limitations
period.60 I saw in that analogy the “natural and orderly and logical
succession” of equitable estoppel.61
The method of history also supported the application of
equitable estoppel to Dasha’s case. True, Cardozo relates the method
of history to such heavily rule-based areas of the law as real estate or
contracts. There, he says, the conceptions
embody the thought, not so much of the present as of
the past, that separated from the past their form and
meaning are unintelligible and arbitrary, and hence that
their development, in order to be truly logical, must be
mindful of their origins.62
But Cardozo’s point -- that mindfulness of the origins of a doctrine
may support its logical development -- has broad applicability. In its
original formulation in Maine, equitable estoppel was notable for its

57
58
59
60
61
62

CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 62 [36].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 31 [15-16].
Dasha, 665 A.2d at 995.
Id. at 997 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 31 [15-16].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 56 [32].
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flexibility. As the Maine Supreme Court wrote in 1893, equitable
estoppel developed in the Chancery Courts of England to ameliorate
the inflexible rules of the common law courts.63 Hence, the court said,
it should not “be confined within the limits of any technical definition
or formula which excludes all cases not within its terms, but . . . it is
entitled to a fair and liberal application for the promotion of honesty
and fair dealing.”64
Somehow, that capacious doctrine had been narrowed by the
Maine Supreme Court in the ways noted by the majority in Dasha.
Instead of a fair and liberal application, the doctrine “should [now] be
‘carefully and sparingly’ applied.”65 Instead of being free of any
formula, the doctrine now required a misrepresentation by a defendant,
subsequent to the negligent act causing injury, that induced a plaintiff
to forego his intended legal action. The analogy that I advanced in my
dissent, comparing Maine Medical Center’s misdiagnosis to a
misrepresentation by the hospital, was consistent with the original
formulation of the doctrine in Maine. We were free, as a later
incarnation of the Supreme Court, to return to that more flexible and
just version of equitable estoppel.
To be sure, as Cardozo warned, such a return would have
consequences for future cases involving equitable estoppel. My
approach would have conflated, for the first time in Maine law, the
misrepresentation about an available legal remedy and the negligent
act itself. On the other hand, how often would the negligence of a party
justify that conflation by destroying the competence of the injured
party? Not often. If my position had prevailed, the breach in the wall
of finality for medical malpractice cases would have been slight.
Then, finally, there is the method of sociology, described by
Cardozo as “the force which in our day and generation is becoming the
greatest of them all.”66 Cardozo explicitly links the method of
sociology to constitutional cases with their great generalities, such as
liberty and due process. In those cases, “[t]he method of sociology in
filling the gaps, puts its emphasis on the social order.”67 He adds that
“[t]he old forms remain, but they are filled with a new content . . . .
63

Hallowell Nat. Bank v. Marston, 85 Me. 488, 27 A. 529, 531 (1893).
Id.
65 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 995 (quoting Vacuum Sys., Inc. v. Bridge Const. Co., 632 A.2d 442,
444 (Me. 1993)).
66 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 65-66 [38].
67 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 71 [42].
64
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We are thinking of the end which the law serves, and fitting its rules to
the task of service.”68
Yet Cardozo insists that the method of sociology should also
be applied to private law, even though “considerations of social utility
are not so aggressive and insistent.”69 There, too, judges must be
prepared to alter the formal application of a rule to serve the ends of
justice. To demonstrate that point, Cardozo cites the famous case of
Riggs v. Palmer,70 which required the New York Court of Appeals to
decide in 1889 if a sixteen-year-old boy who murdered his grandfather
to prevent his disinheritance could still claim property under the will.
Although the probate statutes, literally applied, did not permit the court
to alter the terms of the will, the court refused to apply the statutes as
written. Instead, the court posed this question: “If the lawmakers
could, as to this case, be consulted, would they say that they intended
by their general language that the property of . . . an ancestor should
pass on to one who had taken his life for the express purpose of getting
his property?”71 In answering that question “no,” Cardozo says the
court chose a principle “that was thought to be most fundamental, to
represent the larger and deeper social interests.”72 It was the principle
that “no man should profit from his . . . own wrong.”73
I invoked this same “deeply rooted maxim”74 in my dissent in
Dasha. It is the principle at the heart of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, and it is the principle that captures the unsettling injustice of
the Dasha case. It is also the principle that prompted me to ask in my
dissent in Dasha the same question that the New York Court of
Appeals asked in Riggs v. Palmer.75 Could the Maine legislature have
intended such an unjust result? I did not think so.
Implicit in any statute of limitations [I wrote] . . . is the
notion that an individual subject to the statute has the
capacity for self-protection. Even in cases of medical
misdiagnosis, the misdiagnosed patient at least has the

68

CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 101-02 [63].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 150-51 [96].
70 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
71
Id. at 189.
72 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 40-42 [21-22].
73 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 41-42 [22].
74 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 998 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist.
Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959)).
75 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
69
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capacity to seek a second opinion or to act upon
symptoms that remain troublesome. That capacity for
self-protection arguably moderates the harshness of the
rule that begins the limitations period with the act of
misdiagnosis.76
In Dasha’s case, however, that “capacity for any degree of selfprotection within the statute of limitations period was destroyed by the
very party from whom he [sought] redress.”77 As noted, equitable
estoppel, unlike equitable tolling, focuses on the conduct of the party
who has committed the wrongful act. Although the legislature may
have spoken unequivocally on the availability of equitable tolling to
bar the application of the statute of limitations, it had never spoken on
the availability of equitable estoppel. Under that circumstance, to use
Cardozo’s language, we could have reasonably concluded that the
Maine legislature would not want the statute of limitations to bar
Dasha’s claim when that outcome would offend the community’s
“sense of law and order.”78
I must acknowledge, however, that this application of the
method of sociology in Dasha was relatively easy because of the
congruence between my “anxiety” about the case and the equitable
maxim that “no man should profit from his . . . own wrong.”79 My
dissent had some grounding in familiar law. I did not feel that I was
imposing my personal sense of justice. But there will be cases where
the judge’s anxiety does not match a familiar equitable maxim. How
useful will the method of sociology be then?
Cardozo’s answer is vague, perhaps inescapably so. He
acknowledges that judges “cannot escape” the “empire” of
“subconscious loyalties” “any more than other mortals.”80 Yet he
believes that the wise judge, and Cardozo bets heavily on the wise

76

Dasha, 665 A.2d at 998 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting). I acknowledge that I overstated this point somewhat in my
dissent. Maine Medical Center did not destroy Dasha’s capacity for self-protection for the
entirety of the statute of limitations period. As noted, he was competent at the time of the
misdiagnosis and at the time he received the radiation treatments. Those treatments triggered
a process of mental deterioration that destroyed his competence by March 1989, two years and
nine months before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. It would be more
accurate to say that Maine Medical Center destroyed his capacity for self-protection for a
substantial portion of the statute of limitations period.
78 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 16 [5].
79 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 41-42 [22].
80 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 16 [5].
77
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judge, will engage in a process of creation that harmonizes the personal
with deeply rooted principles and traditions. Observing that “[w]e are
tending more and more toward an appreciation of the truth that, after
all, there are few rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees,”81
Cardozo describes the wise judge at work:
[T]he duty of a judge becomes itself a question of
degree, and he is a useful judge or a poor one as he
estimates the measure accurately or loosely. He must
balance all those ingredients, his philosophy, his logic,
his analogies, his history, his customs, his sense of
right, and all the rest, and adding a little here and taking
out a little there, must determine, as wisely as he can,
which weight shall tip the scales.82
Although Cardozo acknowledges that this description of the
wise judge may seem “a weak and inconclusive summary,”83 he argues
that “the like criticism may be made of most attempts to formulate the
principles which regulate the practice of an art.”84 Ultimately, every
judge must find his or her own way in the art of judging. As he puts
it:
After the wearisome process of analysis has been
finished, there must be for every judge a new synthesis
which he will have to make for himself. The most that
he can hope for is that with long thought and study, with
years of practice at the bar or on the bench, and with the
aid of that inward grace which comes now and again to
the elect of any calling, the analysis may help a little to
make the synthesis a true one.85
Cardozo knows that he is too modest about his achievement.
Using his methods of reasoning in those difficult cases requiring “the
creative or dynamic element”86 of judging, even those judges who are
not among the elect of their calling can reach the true synthesis that
permits the law to evolve sensibly and humanely. Far from a
wearisome analysis, Cardozo’s brilliant lectures on the judicial process
81
82
83
84
85
86

CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 161 [103].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 161-62 [103-04].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 162 [104].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 162 [104].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 162-63 [104].
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 164 [106].
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are a timeless gift for judges who must inescapably fill the gaps in the
law.
EPILOGUE
I must finish the story of Joseph Dasha. Prior to filing the
action in Maine against Maine Medical Center, Margaret Dasha had
filed on Joseph’s behalf a malpractice action in the Superior Court of
Massachusetts against the New England Medical Center pathologist
who, like the Maine Medical Center pathologist, had misdiagnosed
Joseph’s tumor.87 After several twists and turns in the courts of
Massachusetts,88 that lawsuit led to a modest settlement. Joseph was
already well into his radiation treatments as a result of the Maine
misdiagnosis when the New England pathologist also misread his
slides.89 At that point, even a correct diagnosis might not have
prevented much of the damage to Joseph’s brain.
Still, there was enough money in the settlement to fund a trust
for Joseph’s care. Margaret placed him in a good nursing home in
Needham, where she hired a nurse to supplement his care four hours a
day.90 She bought a van with a hydraulic lift so that she and the nurse
could lift Joseph’s wheelchair into the van and take him to dentist
appointments, to visit his old neighborhood in Needham, and to see the
Christmas lights of Boston. He always seemed to enjoy those
outings.91
Joseph died on April 2, 2004 at the age of 72, almost 16 years
after the misdiagnosis of his brain tumor in 1988. At that time, with
the “benefit” of radiation treatment, he was told that he might live two
years. He deserved better.

87 See Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 93-3856-G, 1996 WL 365995, at *1 (Mass. Super. June
25, 1996).
88 See id.; Dasha v Adelman, 699 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. App. 1998).
89 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file
with author).
90 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file
with author).
91 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file
with author).
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APPENDIX


June 13, 1988: A pathologist at Maine Medical Center diagnoses
Joseph Dasha with a fatal brain tumor.



July 5, 1988: Joseph Dasha begins radiation treatments.



August 1, 1988: A neuropathologist at the New England Medical
Center confirms Maine Medical Center’s diagnosis.



August 16, 1988: Joseph Dasha receives final radiation treatment.



March 2, 1989: Joseph Dasha executes a power of attorney in
favor of his sister, Margaret Dasha. The parties agree that Dasha
was mentally incompetent at this point, which is nine months after
the misdiagnosis by Maine Medical Center, and two years and
three months before the expiration of the statute of limitations.



November 1990: A doctor at the Newton-Wellesley Hospital asks
the New England Medical Center neuropathologist to review again
tissue samples from Dasha’s brain tumor.



March 1, 1991: Margaret Dasha is informed that the
neuropathologist has revised his earlier diagnosis, now identifying
the tumor as relatively benign. She received this information two
years and nine months after the misdiagnosis.



May 9, 1992: Margaret Dasha notifies Maine Medical Center of
her intent to file a lawsuit on behalf of her brother, three years and
eleven months after the misdiagnosis.



July 22, 1992: Josepha Dasha is declared legally incompetent and
Margaret Dasha is appointed as his legal guardian.



December 8, 1993: Margaret Dasha files suit against Maine
Medical Center in federal district court in Portland.
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